A Cognitive Pragmatic Review of Natural Discourse by Herczeg-Deli, Ágnes
Eger Journal of English Studies IX (2009) 6177
A Cognitive Pragmatic Review of Natural Discourse
Ágnes Herczeg-Deli
The central issue of this paper is the relation of discourse to its
contextual background. First I will outline the concept of context in a
cognitive pragmatic approach, and then I will explore how mental
processes get involved with the interpersonal plane of discourse (the
term is Sinclairs, 1983). The extracts used for analysis were selected
from recordings of natural conversations on BBC Radio, and they are
meant to reveal linguistic and pragmatic factors that I assume to be
determining components of the verbal interaction of the two
participants at the current moment of the discourse. My research was
qualitative, and the paper is basically expository, aiming at the
observation of the emergence of discourse coherence in the light of
relevance.
1 Introduction
Meaning in context has been investigated by philosophers and linguists from
various aspects for over half a century now. Austins revelation of speech acts
opened a door on meaning in actual communicational situations. Speech act
analysis is concerned with utterances in terms of their potential force in the
communication, i.e. with their function in a particular context, albeit within the
framework of the theory there is no scope for the interpretation and definition of
the concept of context. The social dimensions of a verbal communicational event
are the concern of conversational analysis, which explores the organization of
speaking turns, and the recognition of signals, verbal and non-verbal, that the
participants exploit in the course of a conversation. The structure of discourse,
the nature of its units and the functions of the participants acts in these units are
the subject matter of discourse analysis (see Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975;
Coulthard, 1977: 1985).
The theoretical issues raised for the explanation of the production and
interpretation of utterances are the concern of pragmatics; its goal is to account
for some non-linguistic dimensions of linguistic performance with focus on the
force of an utterance in context and principles of language use. For the past
twenty-odd years, however, pragmatics has moved from its original concern
rooted in philosophy towards the field of cognitive science. Advocates of the
cognitive approach to pragmatics and communication propose theories of how
mental processes operating in the production and understanding of utterances
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can be captured and described in a general framework (see Sperber and Wilson
1986, 1995; Carston 2002a, 2002b). Due to its target and scope of interest,
pragmatics illustrates theories mainly with invented data, and frequently, the
examples are simple and goal-directed individual utterances. In this respect the
validity of pragmatic explanations of language use may sound somewhat
paradoxical. In order to think about discourse in a pragmatic frame there is an
obvious need for investigations of natural language in a corpus-bound approach.
Difficult as it is to trace mental processes in natural language, let alone in
conversation, it should be a central issue for the analyst to reflect on such
questions as: what is the basis for a valid decoding and verbal response to the
thoughts and communicative intentions of the speaker in a natural
communicative event? From another perspective: what is the nature of
coherence in an exchange of a natural conversation? My assumption is that the
surface linguistic phenomena of a discourse can give us cues to the cognitive
processes in progress during the production and interpretation, and this paper is
meant to explore these cues.
2 The form–function dichotomy
In a number of cases the form of the utterance is supposed to guarantee the
discourse function; the grammar can be a token for the hearer to infer the
speakers intention. However, as it was first proved by speech act specialists,
form does not serve as the only signal of function. Discourse analysts also point
out that conversation cannot be given a meaningful structural description based
on the four major sentence types; at the same time, we have to face the fact that
the functional units of discourse are realized by these four grammatical options.
What is possible in discourse analysis is to provide a meaningful structure in
terms of Question and Answer, Challenge and Response, Invitation and
Acceptance (Coulthard 1985, 7). Labov (1972) emphasizes that it is most
important to distinguish between what is said and what is done, and he sketches
rules for interpretation. These rules, however, do not make reference to how the
actual forms of the speakers utterances are conditioned. Grice (1975) subscribes
to the Labovian observation about the possible difference between saying
something and doing something by it, and introduces the term implicature to
explain how the force of an indirect utterance can be represented. He assumes
that inferencing by listeners is essential for interpretation, and that the presence
of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out (1975:50).
He also suggests that the participants of a conversation have an orientation to be
co-operative and are supposed to follow basically four principles in the areas of
quality, quantity, relevance and manner (ibid., 456). Supporting the Gricean
theory of inferencing Sperber and Wilsons discussion of communication
processes emphasizes the observation that pragmatic interpretation goes well
beyond decoding (1986; 1995). They propose a new theoretical framework for
an explanation of comprehension, setting out from the assumption that human
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cognition tends to seek relevance in communication, which is an essential
contextual factor of interpretation processes. In their later work they argue that
interpretation mechanisms of inferential comprehension are metapsychological
through and through (Sperber and Wilson 2002b). They support the view that
inferencing involves the construction and evaluation of a hypothesis about the
communicators meaning on the basis of evidence she has provided for this
purpose (2002b:9).
Natural discourse clearly shows that linguistic straightforwardness is not a
must in communication. Carston makes a justifiable note about communication
saying that the majority of our exchanges are implicature-laden (2002a:145),
and yet, our experience is that it is relatively infrequent that the hearer
misunderstands the speakers meaning. This fact allows us to presume that in
natural discourse there are some contextual factors continually available to the
hearer, other than the grammatical form of an utterance, which control the
interpretation process and the hearers consequent linguistic behaviour.
In view of the crucial role of the contextual factors in comprehension, in the
following part of the paper on the one hand I will be concerned with the concept
of the context and those factors of it that induce the intended meaning or allow
the hearers meaning. On the other hand, I will see whether there are felicitous
lexical signals in the speakers utterance of the intended meaning. These issues
are expected to provide for some answers as to what are the conditions for the
hearer to interpret his partners utterance when it is not straightforward in form,
and also to respond in a way satisfying the pragmatic principles of
cooperativeness.
The investigation will be cognitive-pragmatically oriented. First of all, the
concepts of context, knowledge, and relevance will be discussed, for I assume
that it is through these concepts that some unarticulated constituents of a
discourse event can be elucidated. In section 4.2 the analyses of discourse
extracts aim at a discovery of the discourse acts realized by pragmatically
interpretable schemata and their lexical - conceptual maps. The extracts used for
illustration come from natural conversations on BBC Radio.
3 Interpretation and context
In pragmatic literature the context is usually characterized as indispensable for
the identification of meaning, but its concept is frequently left undefined. Givón
(2005) finds that since the pivotal year of the publication of Austins How to Do
Things with Words (1962) pragmatics has proven itself both indispensible and
frustrating:
Indispensable because almost every facet of our construction of
reality, most conspicuously in matters of culture, sociality and
communication, turns out to hinge upon some contextual pragmatics.
Frustrating because almost every encounter one has with context opens
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up the slippery slope of relativity, and everything is 100 percent
context-dependent (2005:xiii).
In line with Givóns assessment of context we have to admit that due to its non-
objective nature, the concept of context is particularly troublesome to define.
Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:28) define their context of situation as all
relevant factors in the environment, social conventions and the shared
experience of the participants, but they do not go beyond this general statement.
Van Dijks view about the relationship between discourse and context is that one
needs to distinguish between the actual situations of utterances in all their
multiplicity of features, and the selection of only those features that are
linguistically and culturally relevant to the production of utterances (1977). In
his later work van Dijk advances a socio-cognitive description of context by
providing a mental model embedded into a social context and situation (2005;
2006).
Ochs (1979:1) points out that the scope of context includes the social and
the psychological world in which the language user operates at any given time
and he explains that all this involves the language users beliefs and
assumptions about temporal and social settings, prior, ongoing and future actions
(verbal, non-verbal), and the state of knowledge and attentiveness of those
participating in the social interaction in hand (ibid., 5).
Leech (1983) argues that meaning in language use combines semantic and
pragmatic aspects. His general pragmatics has a combinatory character in the
sense that he is both concerned with pragmalinguistics, which is related to
grammar, and socio-pragmatics which he relates to sociology. He includes
context in the criteria of meaning in speech situations, and notes that it has been
understood in various ways, for example to include relevant aspects of the
physical and social setting of an utterance (1983:13). He considers it to be any
background knowledge assumed to be shared by s and h, speaker and hearer,
and which contributes to hs interpretation of what s means by a given
utterance (Leech 1983:13). The problem-solving procedures of planning and
interpreting on the speakers and on the hearers part, respectively, Leech
suggests, involve general human intelligence assessing alternative probabilities
on the basis of contextual evidence (ibid., 36).
Coulter (1994) challenges some deconstructionist, objectivist arguments
about contextuality, and argues for any minimally intelligible text to possess
certain self-explicating features due to the inter-articulation of its conceptual
devices, a parallel to the gestalt-contexture character of situations, rules and
conduct in everyday life (ibid., 689, italics as in the original).
Cognitive pragmatic approaches to communication regard the context as a
mental phenomenon which is essentially dynamic in character. Similarly to van
Dijk (1977) or to Ochs (1979), Sperber and Wilson (1986) see the context as a
psychological construct in the communication process which is controlled by
knowledge as well as by the co-text, two factors which change from moment to
Cognitive Pragmatic Review of Natural Discourse 65
moment. They also propose that the participants make selections from a variety
of possible interpretations at every crucial point of the discourse, and that the
possible choices involve shared assumptions about the world between the
speaker and hearer (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986:147). By advocating this view
Sperber & Wilson assume that for the hearer the context constitutes not only the
immediate physical environment or the meanings of the immediately preceding
utterances, but expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious
beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the
mental state of the speaker, may all play a role in interpretation, too (1986:14
5). Thus in the interpretation process of each item of new information many
different sets of assumptions from diverse sources (long-term memory, short-
term memory, perception) might be selected as context (1986:138). To refer to
the psychological process Sperber and Wilson coin the term context selection,
and the relevance of an utterance is defined in the theory in terms of contextual
effect. Sperber and Wilson argue that newly presented information is relevant to
the hearer when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a
POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT (2002a:251, full capitals as in the original),
and that the greater the contextual effect, the greater the relevance of the
utterance. One type of cognitive effect is CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION,
while other types of it include the strengthening, revision or abandonment of
available assumptions (ibid.).
3.1 Knowledge: a feature of the context, or context: a feature of knowledge
Some cognitivists emphasize that in communication social meaning and context
are conceived of as internal rather than external phenomena (Marmaridou
2000:13; Fetzer 2004:226; van Dijk 2005; 2006). Likewise, van Dijk (2006), in a
broad multidisciplinary approach, considers context a participant construct.
Fetzer (2004:3, 164) points out that the connectedness between a linguistic
expression and its context, in another psychological approach, viz. gestalt
psychology, can be considered in terms of the figureground distinction as
figure and ground, respectively. According to this approach the ground
represents context or common ground, which is generally assumed to denote
knowledge, beliefs and suppositions that are shared, while figure, viz. the
phenomenon being investigated, stands for the linguistic expression with which
it is connected.
In a cognitive understanding of context knowledge is a central concept. The
context is a composite psychological construct which entails awareness of the
physical environment of the communicational situation and familiarity with
socio-cultural aspects of pragmatic meaning, managed by the participants
various mental faculties. In this approach, abilities of retrieving the valid
knowledge structures  scripts and schemata  from the memory, skills of
reasoning and association are part of the context (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986).
Knowledge is basically implicit, but presupposed. From the principle of co-
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operativeness (Grice 1975) it also follows that assumed knowledge between the
participants is crucial; without a sufficient amount of shared knowledge between
the participants efficient communication cannot take place.
The essence of the interdependence of context and the mind can be framed
in the following motto: the context is actually in the mind and the mind is in
the context (see Herczeg-Deli 2009a:105).
3.2 Interpretation and relevance
The speakers meaning cannot be coded in a linguistically explicit form, hence
hearers have to be able to work out implied meanings. In communication valid
inferences are achieved on the basis of knowledge through cognitive operations.
Sperber and Wilsons theory (1986; 1995) proposes that all the pragmatic factors
and processes that operate in communication can be explicated within the
framework of one cognitive phenomenon, which they term relevance after Grice
(see Sperber & Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004; Smith & Wilson
1992).
The core of the theory is Grices proposal that communication is
successful not when hearers recognise the linguistic meaning of the utterance,
but when they infer the speakers meaning from it (Sperber & Wilson
1986:23). A further point of Wilson and Sperber is that the decoding phase of
utterance interpretation provides only input to an inferential phase in which a
linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to
construct a hypothesis about the speakers informative intention (Wilson and
Sperber 1993:1). The theory proposes that in a communication situation every
utterance creates an expectation of relevance worth of the listeners attention and
consideration: any external stimulus or internal representation which provides
an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an individual at some time,
as the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition (Sperber &
Wilson 2002a:250). Thus, every utterance conveys a presumption of its own
relevance. This claim is called the Second, or Communicative, Principle of
Relevance, and the authors argue that it is the key to inferential comprehension
(cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, chapter 3; 2002b). Contradicting Grice
(1975), advocates of Relevance Theory emphasize that relevance is
fundamental to communication not because speakers obey a maxim of relevance,
but because relevance is fundamental to cognition (Smith & Wilson, 1992:2).
In a relevance-theoretic approach the basis of the explanation of how
communication happens is the assumption that for successful communication
utterances in discourse are supposed to be relevant to the context. My
interpretation of context is that it involves a multiplicity of physical, social and
psychological factors, of which the latter play a crucial role. An utterance is
motivated by the speakers need and her goal in the immediate linguistic or non-
linguistic context, and the hearer, potential speaker B, is assumed to be able to
interpret this goal, i.e. speakers meaning, applying his knowledge and information
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available for him in the context. Both decoded and inferred meanings are the
result of mental processes involving various factors of the context which include
the participants intelligence, awareness, knowledge, as well as his logical and
verbal skills. In my view lack of knowledge or insufficient knowledge, just like
uncertainty also have to be considered part of the psychological context, as these
mental states can serve as motivation for elicitations for information or
confirmation in a conversation (cf. Herczeg-Deli 2009a).
No context can be analysed by compositional parsing. Its psychological
component emerges as a result of interacting mental processes constructed and
negotiated all through the communication, and at the same time it has control
over the process of the communication. The following figure, a modified version
of the figure in Herczeg-Deli 2009a:106, is meant to be a schematic illustration
of the processes of production and interpretation of an utterance in discourse as
conditioned by the context:
need
intended meaning
(message)
SPEAKER B:
Broader circumstances (code, culture)
Immediate circumstances:
choice of linguistic form
 physical factors (location)
 social factors (time, co-participants)
Psychological factors:
 the speakers goal, will,
 the participants
KNOWLEDGE potentials
(information pool, memory,
real knowledge and lack of knowledge,
beliefs and assumptions, expectations,
cognitive capacities, logical skills,
experience)
 linguistic environment (preceding
discourse)
interpreted meaning
DECODING
INFERENCE-MAKING
SELECTION
observing relevance
INTERPRETATION
RESPONSE
SPEAKER A: motivation
CONTEXT
Fig. 1. Production and interpretation in discourse
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From the empiricist perspective there may be arguments against a cognitive
interpretation of the context reasoning that mental states are too private to be
detectable, and that there are no clear empirical data available for a study of
what goes on in a mind. In another point of view, however, it is sensible to
assume that even if we dont know exactly what neural processes are going on in
the brain, we can make some hypotheses about how interpretation emerges. A
close linguistic analysis of natural discourse, the investigation of its lexico-
grammatical properties usually provides cues for some inconspicuous
cognitive factors obtaining in the local interpretation. This can also permit
assumptions about some schemas and mental processes involved in the
discourse. My research and observations about discourse processes are in
accordance with the following assumptions made by van Dijk and by Levinson:
i) contexts are not observable  but their consequences are (van Dijk
2006:163), and
ii) certain aspects of linguistic structure sometimes directly encode (or
otherwise interact with) features of the context (Levinson 1983:8).
4. Relevance in discourse
In the following part of the paper linguistic evidence will be found of some
ongoing cognitive processes and of the operation of relevance in natural
discourse.
I assume that relevance in a discourse exchange is conditioned by the
following contextual factors:
a.  Hearers inferences regarding Speakers linguistic behaviour satisfy
Hearers expectations of a relevant act in the communication event.
b.  This judgment about the suitability of Speakers utterance(s) in the current
context serves as a basis for Hearers processing of the stimulus as well as
for her/his response.
Proper interpretation leads to a relevant response, or, looking at it from the other
end of the process: the proof of the positive cognitive effect of Speakers
utterance is a response from Hearer accepted by Speaker as relevant. In the light
of the theory Hearers interpretation can be considered the function of an
utterance understood in terms of its relevance in its context.
4.1 Socio-cultural aspects of the data
Analysing talk in institutional settings or in public contexts such as talk radio
shows requires consideration of certain contextual factors which are not a
component part in other kinds of natural discourse when, for instance, the
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participants have a private conversation. In radio discourse the listeners are not
simply eavesdroppers, but the target audience, which is a relevant factor of the
context. The goal of a talk show is to induce the guest to contribute to the
success of the conversation with a considerable amount of information about
him/herself, and to allow a third party to listen in. Due to the characteristics of
the genre the conversational partners have to restrict themselves to their
communicational roles: the host asks questions and the invited guest answers. In
this respect the participants are not equal, and their discourse strategies are
predetermined accordingly. Participation in such conversations also shows some
asymmetry: the host speaks less, as it is the guest who has to be in the focus of
attention. These controlling factors of the context are, of course, all in the
cognitions of the participants. As regards other types of discourse I assume that
in terms of the intentions, communicational strategies and the mental processes
behind these show similar, if not the same, general properties.
4.2 Interpreting the speaker’s meaning: the observable and the
unobservable
Natural discourse manifests a lot of observable properties. An investigation of
the linguistic realization can provide us with cues for some of the mental
processes generating it, and it also allows for assumptions about contextual
prerequisites for the interpretation. Stubbs (2001:443) notes that what is said is
merely a trigger: a linguistic fragment which allows hearers to infer a
schema., also pointing out that communication would be impossible without
the assumptions which are embodied in schemata. This part of the paper will be
devoted to the analysis of some discourse extracts from a cognitive pragmatic
perspective as it follows from my views of context, knowledge and relevance
discussed in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 4 above.
In the following extract speaker A is the host of the talk show, late John
Dunn, one of the best-known voices in his time on BBC2, and B is his special
guest, Keith Waterhouse (died in 2009), newspaper columnist for the Daily
Mirror until 1988 and thereafter for the Daily Mail, writer of a newspaper style
book. The time of the interview is 31st October 1989.
(1) A1: But they must have you must have been accused # from many
quarters of turning your coat, surely.
 B1: [ ] # Well, I hadnt all that much because [ ] [ ] the column
was there but it still got barbed wire around it. [ m] # Nobody
can touch it. Its the same column, # you know. As I said to
Captain Bob Im simply # moving from the Palladium to the
Colosseum. Its the same act. Its like Max Wall.
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 A2: (laughs) # Youre your column is inviolate  if if     no ones
B bch: yes
 ~A2: allowed to touch a single thing on it.
B2: No, no, t was too valuable to me.
 A3: Somebody just cant get at it.
 B3:  No.
 A (laughs)
 B (laughs)
To respond appropriately speaker B has to grasp the relevance of the first
speakers words, and find out his intention. For the latter, in the context
described above familiarity with the character of the programme, the participant
roles and the goal of the host serve as a plausible cue: As job is to ask, and for
interpretation the linguistic form has to be measured against the Hearers, Bs,
assumption about this goal. As accepting attitude (see turns A2 and A3) towards
the response is proof of Bs proper context selection (see Sperber and Wilson
1986). The indirect form used by A had a positive cognitive effect (Sperber
and Wilson 2002a): his partner interpreted it as Elicitation for Confirmation
and/or for Information. The epistemic modality represented by the auxiliary must
has the contextual implication of the speakers strong hypothesis concerning a
Situation B may have experienced. As regards their function, my data show that
Hypothetical utterances in an Initiation Move of a discourse exchange typically
elicit some kind of Evaluation of the assumed situation submitted by the speaker
in the proposition. The hypothetical situation then is either accepted as true or
rejected as false by the communicational partner. Rejections are generally
supported by some Reason, some explanation or details of reality, as in our case
above.
In the interpretation process the Hearers further cognitive task is contextual
meaning selection for the lexical units in the Speakers utterance, by considering
relevant contextual information. The referents of the indexicals and the noun
phrases in discourse have to be activated in the memory of the participants or
selected on the grounds of the available contextual information. There is a good
reason for us to think that in extract (1) the referents of the personal pronoun
they were identified by B without difficulty, in spite of the fact that after a short
consideration speaker A changed his initial linguistic choice for a passive
structure. Due to the context selection going on in the minds of the participants
such kind of vagueness does not necessarily disrupt mutual understanding, or
cause communicative failure, and from the preceding discourse even the
listeners of the programme can infer a plausible meaning: A probably had Bs
colleagues working for the Daily Mirror in mind, where B had his previous job.
As this is not a crucial topic in the process of interaction, the interviewers
change for the noun phrase many quarters does not sound misinterpretable
either. Contextual knowledge is a guarantee for proper sense selection for
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quarters. The interpretation obviously requires the abandonment of several of
the possible context-independent meanings such as one of four parts, fifteen
minutes, a part of a town, an American or Canadian coin, and in the current
context in As rerun it possibly involved the broadening of the possible circle of
the referents of the pronoun they to many others who the speaker could not or
did not want to name. No referent has to be identified for the noun phrase your
coat, as for anybody who speaks good English it is inferable that the speaker
uses it in the metaphorical sense in an idiom, in which the verb turn is also used
in the abstract sense, and it would not be plausible to associate the situation with
the law court either just because the verb accused appears in the discourse.
The response in Move B1 entails a lot of diverse sources of assumed
common knowledge, too. From Bs profession, which is journalism, contextual
information is available for the proper selection of the meaning of the noun
column excluding the possibility of reference to a tall cylinder which is usually
part of a building, to a group of people or animals moving in a line or to a
vertical section of a printed text. The selection of the metaphorical meaning of
barbed wire around it is a plausible corollary of the contextual meaning of the
noun column, and it is this metaphor that allocates the verb touch an abstract
meaning. Bs discourse presupposes a common cultural background for the
interpretation of the proper nouns the Palladium and the Colosseum, and
similarly, for his reference to Captain Bob and Max Wall. The assumed
knowledge that the two names, the former of which was a nickname dubbed by
him, speaker B personally, refer to one and the same famous English comedian,
and the context in which the speaker associates himself with him is exploited as
a source of humour, which is appreciated by his host, and potentially by the
audience, with laughter.
Speaker As reaction in the Follow-up Move, A2 and A3, is an excellent
example of contextual inference, which he made on the grounds of Bs
explanation of his circumstances. It emerges as a kind of summary, a
reformulation of the assumed essence of speaker Bs words: your column is
inviolate if if no ones allowed to touch a single thing on it. Somebody just cant
get at it, which B accepts as a valid interpretation (B2 and B3), and gives a
logical Reason: t was too valuable to me.
The first exchange of the extract, A1B1, shows a discourse pattern which
Winter (1982; 1994) identifies as a frequently occurring semantic structure in
written text: the HypotheticalReal, a cognitive schema, which also commonly
emerges in conversations (cf. also Deli 2004; Deli 2006; Herczeg-Deli 2009a).
The analysis of the short discourse above permits the conclusion that the
following are essential contextual factors for interpretation:
awareness of the situation, the goal of the discourse and of the
participant roles
knowledge of the subject matter of the discourse
knowledge of the relevant socio-cultural environment
linguistic knowledge
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logical skills and abilities for sense-selection observing relevance
knowledge of relevant cognitive schemas.
In the characterization of natural discourse exchanges some of the cognitive
perspectives of the context are fairly easily identifiable. The discourse attributes
of extract (1) e.g. can be summarised as follows:
Participant roles: Host = interviewer (A) Guest = interviewee (B)
Contextually assumed
intentions:
Seeking information/
confirmation
Giving information
Discourse moves: Initiation Response
Discourse functions of
utterances:
Elicitation Giving information/
confirmation
Cognitive operations:
in A1B1 Assumption Rejection (+ Reason)
in A2B2 Assumption (inferred) Acceptance
in A3B3 Assumption (reformulated) Acceptance
Emerging discourse schemas:
in A1B1  Hypothetical   Real
in A2B2  Evaluation   Evaluation
in A3B3
Table 1. The discourse attributes of extract (1)
Communicative goals can be achieved by various linguistic forms, which can be
detected in natural speech via insight into the speakers discourse planning
process. The following extract reveals how the first speaker, after deliberating as
to which linguistic form to chose for his information seeking Elicitation, decides
on a Hypothetical Evaluation, reinforced by a tag question:
(2) A: But [ the idea [ # it is quite important, actually, when you think
about it that a newspaper should have # a universal style. I mean
it would look a bit silly if it printed recognize in one place with a
zed and one place with an
ess wouldnt it?
B: Yes,  but [ m]    some [ n] [ n] [ n] I think whats more [ m]
important is that a newspaper should have a good #
recognizable [ :] voice. And the idea of this # thing was that
was that when I # first came to to [ :] [ ] work in popular
journalism # [ ] we # used to talk in in [ ] what my [k] [ ]
guru, Hugh Cudlip would, you know, one of the founding fathers
of the Daily Mirror called good, clear doorstep English. [ ] you
It was the language of the people, you know, it was the language
the people spoke themselves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In this context the question tag at the end of As Elicitation is obviously not
crucial for the interpretation, which is clear from the fact that B starts responding
before the question is uttered. The Hypothetical proposition reflecting the
speakers assumption does its job; just like in extract (1), it elicits a response, by
which the HypotheticalReal schema emerges. Here it is interlinked with the
schema of EvaluationEvaluation, and combines with some specification of the
contextually Unspecific and Specific.
Winter (1992 and elsewhere) and Hoey (1983) identify a semantic
relationship between textual elements which they label the UnspecificSpecific
or the GeneralParticular pattern, respectively. Probing such textual units Hoey
(ibid.) distinguishes between two varieties: PreviewDetail and Generalization
Example, and points out that in their identification the context plays a crucial
role. Specification is a commonly occurring cognitive process in spoken
discourse, too (see Deli 2004; 2006, Herczeg-Deli 2009a; 2009b). After Winter I
tag the cognitive relationship between two discourse units in which the second
gives details about the local interpretation of the first the contextually
UnspecificSpecific schema.
Table 2 below is meant to display the lexical cues of the cognitive schemas
that are identifiable in the two moves of exchange (2):
MOVES HYPOTHETICAL EVALUATION REAL
Initiation: it is quite important
when you think
should have a universal style
it would look a bit silly
if it printed...with a
[zed]
                 ...with an
[ess]
Response: I think more important UNSPECIFIC
a good, recognizable
voice
a good, clear doorstep
English
      SPECIFIC
the language of the people
the language the people
spoke themselves
Table 2. The conceptual map of exchange (2)
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As can be worked out from this conceptual map, for his response the second
speaker interprets the first speakers Hypothetical Evaluation as an Elicitation
for Evaluation, of which the cue concept is his expectation of a universal style in
newspapers. Bs Evaluation (more important,) realizes the act of Correction, a
variant of Rejection. His evaluative concept a good, recognizable voice does not
refer to some absolute value, and, aware of this he gives a local interpretation.
What he calls a recognizable voice is specified with a metaphorical expression:
doorstep English, and to ensure the appropriate interpretation of what he is
trying to communicate he clarifies the meaning: the language of the people, the
language the people spoke themselves. In the current context both the
contextually Unspecific concept and its Specification describe the Real situation
as a necessary counterpoint to what speaker A assumed in his Hypothetical
proposition.
The discourse attributes of the extract are in some respect similar to those
of the first one above. The difference is in the emergence of the Unspecific
Specific schema in the second speakers move here:
Participant roles: Host = interviewer (A) Guest = interviewee (B)
Contextually assumed
intentions:
Seeking information/
confirmation Giving information
Discourse moves: Initiation Response
Discourse functions of
utterances: Elicitation
Giving information/
confirmation
Cognitive operations: Assumption Rejection (by Correction)
Emerging discourse
schemas:
   Hypothetical 
   Evaluation 
    Real
    Evaluation
UnspecificSpecific
Table 3. The discourse attributes of exchange (2)
In the following discourse John Dunns special guest is Mike Batt, one of
Britains best-known songwriters, composers and recording artists:
(3) A1:Now, how did you choose the tracks?
B1: Just by discussion, really. There were some # tracks which
Justin said [ ] Id like to do these, and some which I said # and
there often were # songs which # meant something to us
personally, there might be songs which # one of us # would
think t would be nice to do this in a particular way having
decided that we would do it with an orchestra and a valco. #
And [ # so we just [ [ [ ] did this by discussion, I mean
with this sort of # rang each other every night until one of us
thought of another one. Everything.
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A2: Could [ ] ended up with a very large album.
B2: Yeah, we could [ ] done about ten albums, actually.
In move A2 the speaker makes a realistic inference based partly on the details of
what B tells him about his and his colleagues approach to their preparation for
their new record, partly on his original knowledge about his guest. The inference
is realized in a Hypothetical unit, whose modal value is signalled by the irrealis
could [ ]. The communicative value of the utterance, As intention, is
interpreted by speaker B as need for confirmation and/or for further information.
Response B2 starts with Yeah, which, on the surface, sounds like confirmation,
i.e. like acceptance of As assumed proposition as true. In fact, it is followed by
the correction of As hypothesis: about ten albums, actually, which assigns Bs
utterance the function of Rejection. This meaning is emphasized by the
attitudinal adverbial actually. In this context yeah means no; it is not an integral
part of the correction; it is said to indicate that the speaker understands his
partners meaning. Its function is, very plausibly, back-channelling.
This discourse extract can also be analysed as an example of how
vagueness is interpreted in certain local contexts of natural conversation. The
concept of a very large album is rather vague in itself; its meaning is relative to
contextual knowledge about the world of music. The meaning of the noun phrase
about ten albums is similarly far from exact. For all this, its vagueness is not an
obstacle to a plausible inference about the speakers intention. In this context the
expression becomes relevant through its implicature: many more than enough
for one large album. On the whole, in move B2 the speaker adds some clue for
further inference: they had many more songs on the list than what appeared on
the record. The exchange (A2B2) shows the HypotheticalHypothetical schema
emerging.
5 Conclusions
In this paper my goal was to give evidence of how the interpretation of the
global and the local factors of the context contribute to the participants
behaviour in their verbal interactions, as well as how the cognitive properties of
discourse can be analysed. It has been demonstrated that the lexical signals of
some cognitive factors of communication can be recognized through such
discourse attributes as participant roles, contextually assumed intentions,
discourse moves, the assumed functions of utterances and discourse schemas
emerging in the communication. The investigation of the mental components of
natural discourse via linguistic traces within the frames of Relevance Theory can
also provide an explanation for how verbal interactions are controlled by such
contextual factors as discourse schemata.
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Abbreviations and symbols used in the discourse extracts
A: speaker As move
~A: speakers move is continued
B: speaker Bs move
B bch: speaker is back-channelling
# : a short pause
 parallel speech
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